2018-04-06 - I WENT AFTER RIG EK LIKE IT WAS A SNAKE ON WHACKING DAY
ASSOCIATED FILES:
- Zip archive of the infection traffic: 2018-04-06-Rig-EK-sends-Bunitu-2-pcaps.zip 579 kB (579,227 bytes)
- 2018-04-06-Rig-EK-traffic-1st-run.pcap 403 kB (403,019 bytes)
- 2018-04-06-Rig-EK-traffic-2nd-run.pcap 286 kB (285,834 bytes)
- 2018-04-06-Rig-EK-flash-exploit-both-runs.swf 16 kB (15,998 bytes)
- 2018-04-06-Rig-EK-landing-page-1st-run.txt 96 kB (95,872 bytes)
- 2018-04-06-Rig-EK-landing-page-2nd-run.txt 96 kB (95,933 bytes)
- 2018-04-06-Rig-EK-payload-1st-run.exe 279 kB (279,040 bytes)
- 2018-04-06-Rig-EK-payload-2nd-run.exe 163 kB (162,816 bytes)
- eunlock.dll 15 kB (14,848 bytes)
NOTES:
- I originally recorded this traffic on Friday 2018-04-06, but I wasn't able to review it until Monday 2018-04-09.
- No post-infection traffic is available in the pcaps. It's just Rig EK and some traffic leading up to it.
- Bunitu doesn't immediately generate its post-infection traffic, and I didn't wait long enough when I originally recoded these pcaps.
- I used an older version of Flash, so I don't think the Flash exploit I saw from Rig EK was for CVE-2018-4878.
- Ultimately, I'm just part of a security community mob going after Rig EK like it's a snake on Whacking Day.
Shown above: Quote from Homer, "Lisa, maybe if I'm part of that mob, I can help
steer it in wise directions. Now, where's my giant foam cowboy hat and airhorn?"
WEB TRAFFIC BLOCK LIST
Indicators are not a block list. If you feel the need to block web traffic, I suggest the following domains:
- thingiverse[.]com
- domslavx[.]info
- x.lxoxiaudio[.]com
- y.lxoxiaudio[.]com
TRAFFIC
Shown above: Infection traffic filtered in Wireshark.
TRAFFIC FROM AN INFECTED WINDOWS HOST:
- 78.47.1[.]201 port 80 - thingiverse[.]com - bogus site set up for this campaign
- 88.198.94[.]52 port 80 - domslavx[.]info - Gate leading to Rig EK
- 46.30.42[.]150 port 80 - 46.30.42[.]150 - Rig EK (1st run)
- 46.30.43[.]235 port 80 - 46.30.43[.]235 - Rig EK (2nd run)
TRAFFIC WHEN I LATER ANALYZED ONE OF THE PAYLOAD BINARIES (BUNITU):
- DNS query for x.lxoxiaudio[.]com, resolved to 136.54.81[.]16
- DNS query for y.lxoxiaudio[.]com, resolved to 130.142.198[.]45
- 95.169.186[.]63 port 443 - encoded traffic caused by Bunitu (not HTTPS/SSL/TLS)
- 85.17.45[.]2 port 443 - encoded traffic caused by Bunitu (not HTTPS/SSL/TLS)
- 96.44.144[.]181 port 443 - encoded traffic caused by Bunitu (not HTTPS/SSL/TLS)
FILE HASHES
RIG EK FLASH EXPLOIT:
- SHA256 hash: d871fa0e1ac9e03e65b71fc9f3261a320e63fd1731fae33595f79ec51d5fabc4
File size: 15,998 bytes
File description: Rig EK flash exploit seen on Friday 2018-04-06
1ST RUN RIG EK MALWARE PAYLOAD:
- SHA256 hash: 12dc4c44b0bdbe2efb8d10de14b09682589069e3f2ea0c82b21c4270455d199d
File size: 279,040 bytes
File description: Rig EK payload - Bunitu executable
2ND RUN RIG EK MALWARE PAYLOAD:
- SHA256 hash: 5a49dfdc87158cca5e0990361d57d870fde6aa6f63d16096698ba4c244bc3b54
File size: 162,816 bytes
File description: Rig EK payload - Bunitu executable
ARTIFACT AFTER RUNNING ONE OF THE ABOVE BINARIES ON A WINDOWS HOST:
- SHA256 hash: e4a1f94d58bd5ef7875991688017465441d99edc0d663bdac813bb9d03cae258
File size: 14,848 bytes
File location: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\eunlock.dll
Registry data: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\eunlock.dll",eunlock
Shown above: Bunitu made persistent on an infected Windows host.
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